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Abstract 
The present paper integrates the operations management and the management control 
literature in order to focus on the issue of strategic alignment of manufacturing 
processes in a Balanced Scorecard-based compensation plan. The specific objectives for 
this paper are twofold. First, the study offers a theoretical foundation for the thesis that 
alignment of manufacturing processes with business strategy will result in higher 
organizational performance. Second, a case study at a Belgian manufacturing division of 
a Danish Corporate Company shows that it is not possible to realize higher 
organizational performance when there is no strategic alignment of manufacturing 
processes. 
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Introduction 
In the first of three Harvard Business Review articles, Kaplan and Norton (1992) 
introduced the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). Kaplan and Norton (1996) defined the BSC 
as a framework to facilitate the translation of strategy into action. More specifically, the 
BSC has been labeled “a comprehensive system of linked measurements”. The 
characteristic of „comprehensiveness‟ in the BSC involves the provision of measures 
into four different perspectives: the financial perspective, the customer perspective, the 
internal business process perspective and the learning and growth perspective. The 
characteristic of „linked measurements‟ concerns the linkages between strategy and 
operational performance measures.    
Initially, Kaplan and Norton (1996) treated the BSC as a performance measurement 
system. They began with the premise that an exclusive reliance on financial measures in 
a management system was causing organizations to do the wrong things. Financial 
measures are lagging indicators: they report on the outcomes of past actions. Exclusive 
reliance on financial indicators promoted short-term behavior that sacrificed long-term 
value creation. Therefore, the BSC retained the financial performance measures but 
supplemented them with nonfinancial performance measures or leading indicators. More 
recently, Kaplan and Norton (2001, a) have transformed the BSC from a performance 
measurement system to a strategic management control system (strategic performance 
measurement system). Kaplan and Norton became aware that successful organizations 
were strategy-focused organizations that used their BSCs to align key management 
processes and systems to the strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2001, b, c). The final linkage 
from high-level strategy to day-to-day actions occurs when companies link individuals‟ 
incentives and reward programs to the Balanced Scorecard. For the purposes of this 
paper we will define reward programs linked to the Balanced Scorecard a BSC-based 
compensation plan.  
 
This paper aims to focus on the issue of strategic alignment of manufacturing processes 
in a BSC-based compensation plan, therefore this paper integrates operations 
management and management control literature. 
In operations management research, there is a variety of authors that claim that a 
company will perform better if it links its operations strategy to the business strategy 
(Smith and Reece, 1999). In this study, strategic alignment of manufacturing processes 
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is defined in terms of clear links between the manufacturing processes (at the functional 
level) and the business strategy (at the corporate level). Having clear links between the 
manufacturing processes and the business strategy encompasses decomposing high-level 
strategic measures into local operational measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). A high 
level financial measure such as return-on-investment or economic value added can be 
translated into local operational measures such as operating expenses, days sales in 
accounts receivable or gross margins. In the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) literature, the 
process of translating high level strategic measures into local level operational measures 
is called „the cascading process‟. 
In the operations management literature, there is a research stream that examines the 
relationship between strategic alignment and organizational performance. Joshi et al. 
(2003) studied the relationship between alignment of manufacturing priorities (between 
the manufacturing manager and the general manager) and the manufacturing unit‟s 
performance. Smith and Reece (1999) studied this relationship in a service setting 
(wholesale distribution setting). In general, these studies found a positive effect of 
strategic alignment on organizational performance; however contingency variables 
might moderate the original relationship. 
In a BSC-setting, there is also an issue of strategic alignment of manufacturing processes 
through cascading. However, Ittner and Larcker (1998) stated that there has been 
conducted surprisingly little research on the performance consequences of the Balanced 
Scorecard Concept. In other words, in a BSC-setting, there is no empirical evidence that 
strategic alignment between the business strategy and the operations strategy will lead to 
higher organizational performance.  
 
The creation of strategic alignment between the business strategy and the operations 
strategy involves a strategic management control system that includes operational 
performance measures deducted from the business strategy. In management control, 
there is a research stream that examines the performance consequences of matching the 
business strategy to the strategic management control system. The case studies of 
Abernethy and Lillis (1995) showed that a combination of more non-accounting 
performance measures in the management control system and a strategy of 
manufacturing flexibility improved organizational performance. The questionnaire 
survey of Perera et al. (1997) found an association between customer-focused strategies 
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and the use of nonfinancial (operations-based) performance measures. However, their 
study was not able to find a consequential effect on organizational performance. Perera 
et al. (1997) attributed this lack of improved organizational performance to the absence 
of a performance-based compensation plan. 
In this paper, we want to investigate if the relationship between strategy, choice of 
performance measures and organizational performance in conjunction with a 
performance-based compensation plan can lead to higher organizational performance 
because in practice many companies make a link between the compensation plan and the 
performance measurement system. More specifically, we want to investigate this 
research question in a BSC-setting because Ittner and Larcker (1998) stated that the 
performance consequences of this link are not yet investigated. 
 
In light of these opportunities, the specific objectives for this paper are twofold: 
1) We develop the proposition that the alignment of manufacturing processes with the 
corporate strategy is a precondition to motivate higher organizational performance 
with a BSC-based compensation plan (theoretical foundation). 
2) We want to show, by means of a case study, that it is not possible to realize higher 
organizational performance when there is no strategic alignment of manufacturing 
processes (theory illustration case). 
 
Theoretical foundation 
Joshi et al. (2003) tested whether the performance of the manufacturing unit is enhanced 
when general managers and manufacturing managers agree on strategic priorities. Their 
study found indirect effects of strategic alignment on organizational performance 
because the relationship between strategic alignment and organizational performance 
was moderated by organizational variables
3
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 The relationship between strategic alignment and organizational performance was moderated by 
organizational variables such as organizational tenure of the manufacturing manager and years of 
association between the general manager and the manufacturing manager . More specifically, they found 
that strategic alignment of manufacturing processes is especially critical when the manufacturing 
managers are relatively new to the organization (Joshi et al. (2003)). 
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The study of Smith and Reece (1999) demonstrated that the fit between the business 
strategy and the operational strategy has a significant positive and direct effect on 
organizational performance. More importantly, they found that this fit was a more 
important determinant of organizational performance than the type of strategy. In other 
words, it was not the type of strategy (low cost strategy, differentiation strategy or a 
combination strategy) that determined organizational performance but it was the extent 
of fit between the business strategy and the operational strategy that determined 
organizational performance.  
Thus, we get the following premiss: 
P1: As strategic alignment between the business goals (corporate level) and the 
operational goals (functional level) increases, organizational performance will 
increase. 
 
In BSC-organizations, the cascading process is used to align employees to the strategic 
objectives of the firm. Furthermore, the cascading process has a role in customizing the 
BSC to the (sub)-units because during the cascading process high-level strategic 
objectives are translated into local actions (Epstein and Manzoni, 1998). Through the 
cascading process a BSC-organization is able to define controllable performance 
measures. A performance measure is under control if the manager can control the 
probability distribution of the performance measure through his actions (Antle and 
Demski, 1988). 
Thus, we get the following premiss 
P2: As strategic alignment of manufacturing processes increases, the 
controllability of performance measures will increase. 
 
Strategic alignment of manufacturing processes results in controllable performance 
measures. Through strategic alignment, individuals are intrinsically motivated to 
accomplish organizational goals (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). The strategic alignment 
process enables individuals to see the link between what they do and the organization‟s 
long-term objectives. Through strategic alignment of manufacturing processes 
individuals internalize the organizational goals and strive to achieve those goals even 
when these goals are not explicitly tied to the compensation plan.  
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Several studies have found that this kind of intrinsic motivation leads to more creative 
problem solving and to innovation and consequently to higher organizational 
performance (Baker, 1988; Sansone and Harackiewicz, 2000). 
Thus, we arrive at the following premiss: 
P3: Increased controllability of performance measures will result in higher 
organizational performance through intrinsic motivation. 
 
We use Vroom‟s (1964) expectancy theory to explain how extrinsic motivation can lead 
to higher organizational performance. Vroom‟s theory has been summarized as follows: 
“The strength of a tendency to act in a certain way depends on the strength of an 
expectancy that the act will be followed by a given consequence (or outcome) and on the 
value or attractiveness of that consequence (or outcome) to the actor” (Kreitner et al. 
2002). There are three key concepts in Vroom‟s model namely: expectancy, 
instrumentality and valence. An expectancy represents an individual‟s belief that a 
particular degree of effort will be followed by a particular level of performance. An 
instrumentality represents a person‟s belief that a particular outcome (e.g. bonus) is 
contingent on accomplishing a specific level of performance. A valence refers to the 
positive or negative value people place on outcomes. 
Therefore, according to expectancy theory, an individual‟s motivation and subsequent 
effort are significantly higher when compensation is based on performance, due to both 
an increased expectancy about the effort-outcome relationship and an increased valence 
of the outcome (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). 
So, we arrive at the following premiss. 
P4: Financial incentives linked to controllable performance measures will result in 
higher organizational performance through extrinsic motivation. 
 
Above premisses are depicted in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical model of strategic alignment of manufacturing processes and 
organizational performance 
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Methodology 
Choice of research method 
According to Shields (1997), following research methods are frequently found in 
management control: analytic research, archival research, case study research, survey 
research and laboratory experimentation. When addressing the question: “Which 
research method is appropriate in our research project?”; Yin (1989) suggests that 
various research methods are not mutually exclusive. However, according to Yin (1989) 
there exist certain situations in which a specific research method has a distinct 
advantage. For the case study approach to have a distinct advantage, a „how‟ or „why‟ 
question should be asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher 
has little or no control (Yin, 1989, p. 20). The particulars of this study, in terms of the 
conditions suggested by Yin, strongly suggest the case study as the most appropriate 
research method. 
We use Keating‟s (1995) „framework for classifying and evaluating case research in 
management control‟ as a guide to decide what information we must include in our case 
research paper. Because the objective of this case research paper is to provide evidence 
in support of above formulated theory, we want to conduct a theory illustration case 
study. More specifically, we want to apply above formulated theory to develop a unique 
explanation of our particular case. 
 
Sampling 
DC-Company, the company name has been disguised at the request of the participating 
company, is a leading producer of polyolefin plastics. The unit of analysis is a Belgian 
manufacturing division of a Danish Corporate Company. The research site consists of 
three manufacturing locations with a total production of 900.000 tons polyolefins in 
1999. Sales amounted to 1,1 billion euro. DC-Company counted approximately 670 
employees. 
The authors gained access to this company because of a business relationship between 
one of the authors and executives of the company. In this sense, the case study has not 
benefited from a random sampling approach however the research site is attractive on 
objective grounds.  
The data in this study were collected by way of in-depth interviews. Interviewees were 
chosen at random. Interview data were obtained from six middle-level managers who 
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were rewarded under the company‟s BSC-based compensation plan. Among the middle-
level managers, there were four production unit managers and two staff members. These 
managers had at the time of the interview at least one year of experience with the BSC-
based compensation plan. They all experienced the complete introduction of the BSC-
based compensation plan. 
 
Data collection 
The researchers obtained archival data (background and policy documents) from 
managers who administer the BSC and the BSC-based compensation plan. All interview 
data were obtained via in-depth interviews in August 2000. Interviews lasted from 30 
minutes to 90 minutes, depending on how much an interviewee had to say. The two 
authors attended all interviews. One researcher asked questions and the other researcher 
took notes and captured commentary. After each interview, the two researchers 
conferred immediately to complete abbreviated comments that might be difficult to 
decipher later. 
The study used a semi-structured interview format and assured respondents of 
anonymity. More specifically the researchers asked following open questions: 
1. Describe the scorecard that serves as the basis for your BSC-based bonus. 
2. What is the company‟s strategy? 
3. Do you feel more motivated to accomplish organizational goals after the 
implementation of the BSC-based compensation plan? (All interviewees 
experienced the complete introduction of the BSC-based compensation plan) 
Follow-up: 
 In case of a positive experience with the BSC-based compensation plan: 
3.a. Which aspects of the BSC and the BSC-based compensation plan are 
major sources of your motivation? 
In case of a negative experience with the BSC-based compensation plan: 
3.b. Which aspects of the BSC and the BSC-based compensation plan are 
major sources of your demotivation and frustration? 
 
An important benefit of open questions is that respondents may identify factors that 
affect the effectiveness of the BSC and of the BSC-based compensation plan other than 
those anticipated by the study‟s theory. 
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Theory illustration case 
Strategy of the research site 
The company‟s strategy is to be a leader in issues affecting health, safety and 
environment (HSE). Top Management believes in a Zero Mindset, which means the 
determination to achieve zero work-related accidents, injuries and illness, and the steady 
reduction of plant emissions. DC-Company has high ambitions in setting challenging 
targets. They see only one way of winning – and that is with and through their people. 
 
Purpose of the BSC  
The most important aim of introducing the BSC in the Belgian manufacturing division 
was to improve goal orientation. Before the BSC, the company listed more than 100 
initiatives for goal orientation. The first attempt to improve goal orientation was in 
January 1998. A few members of the management team agreed to cluster the initiatives 
and to group them into larger objectives. The first approach to become more goal-
oriented was inspired by the EFQM-model. Since the EFQM-model is not a 
performance measurement system, the Corporate Company launched the BSC in the 
third quarter of 1998. 
Furthermore, the BSC was used as an instrument for evaluating and compensating 
middle-level managers. The BSC was, in other words, the starting point for a BSC-
based compensation plan. 
 
Structure of the BSC 
DC-Company has arranged its measures in categories that reflect its own priorities and 
culture. The four scorecard perspectives in this company are „Responsible Care‟, 
„Manufacturing‟, „Customer‟ and „People‟. The „Responsible Care‟ perspective contains 
performance measures for health, safety and environment. The „Manufacturing‟ 
perspective contains performance measures that represent the degree of efficiency of 
internal business processes. The performance measures in the „Customer‟ perspective 
measure customer satisfaction. The performance measures in the „People‟ perspective 
are measures for the learning and growth-capacity. 
A summary of the measures currently used in the BSC of DC-Company is shown in 
table 1. 
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Table 1: Performance measures in the BSC 
Perspective Performance measure Target 
Responsible care Industrial accidents No industrial accidents 
Responsible care Sick leave due to industrial 
accidents 
Healthy employees 
Responsible care Factory emissions No factory emissions 
Manufacturing Fixed costs Minimize fixed costs 
Manufacturing Labor costs Minimize labor costs 
Manufacturing Scrap Minimize scrap 
Manufacturing Productivity Maximize productivity 
Manufacturing Rework  Minimize rework 
People Sick leave High motivated employees 
People Training days Multi-skilled employees 
Customer On time delivery Satisfied customers 
Customer Complaint frequency Satisfied customers 
 
Description of the BSC-based compensation plan 
The driving concept of BSC-based compensation plans is to pay individuals for 
performance. Pay for performance means that at least some portion of a manager‟s 
income is not guaranteed but depends on results on performance measures. 
We will use the framework of Hilton (2003) to describe the BSC-based compensation 
plan of DC-Company. 
 
 Absolute and relative performance 
DC-Company uses a mix of absolute and relative performance measures. DC-Company 
evaluates managers on absolute achievement of financial and nonfinancial measures for 
which it finds it possible to set appropriate absolute objectives. DC-Company also 
evaluates managers on relative achievement of financial and nonfinancial measures for 
which benchmarking data in comparative industries are available. 
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 Financial and nonfinancial performance 
Financial performance reflects the achievement of financial goals. Nonfinancial 
performance is not measured in monetary terms and often reflects the drivers of 
financial performance.  
In table 2, you can find an overview of both financial and nonfinancial BSC 
performance measures used in the BSC-based compensation plan of DC-Company. 
 
Table 2: Performance measures in the BSC-based compensation plan 
Perspective Performance measure Financial/ 
Nonfinancial 
Responsible care  industrial accidents Nonfinancial 
Responsible care Sick leave (days) due to industrial 
accidents 
Nonfinancial 
Manufacturing Fixed costs (million €) Financial 
Manufacturing  ton rework Nonfinancial 
Manufacturing  ton scrap Nonfinancial 
Customer Complaint frequency Nonfinancial 
Customer On time delivery Nonfinancial 
People  training days Nonfinancial 
 
When you compare table 2 to table 1, you can see that DC-Company only links pay to 
those performance measures for which they think extrinsic motivation is needed to 
motivate performance on the measure. 
 
 Broad responsibility of performance 
An organization can define performance narrowly or broadly. In this regard, a manager‟s 
reward can depend on the performance of that individual, on the performance of the 
business unit or on the performance of the company as a whole. At DC-company 
rewards depend on the performance of the company and therefore managers have a 
broad responsibility for performance. 
From expectancy theory, we know that financial incentives are most effective when 
performance measures are controllable, attainable and accurate (Vroom, 1964). In order 
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to have controllable performance measures in a BSC-environment, we consider strategic 
alignment of the manufacturing processes as a precondition. However, DC-Company 
has failed to cascade the BSC throughout the organization. DC-Company used a top-
down approach to implement the BSC at the manufacturing division. The functional 
scorecard was developed centrally (on corporate level) and assigned to functional level 
without initial input from the divisions. As a consequence bonus pay of middle-level 
managers is determined by corporate performance on the performance measures and 
thus middle-level managers are confronted with uncontrollable, unattainable and 
inaccurate performance measures. We will discuss the consequences of this working 
method in the discussion section. 
 
 Formula-based  performance 
DC-Company bases rewards on a performance evaluation formula, which describes 
rewards earned for specific achievement. The advantage of a formula-based plan is that 
managers know precisely what is expected of them and what reward they will receive 
relative to expectations.  
You can find a profound description of the BSC-based compensation plan in appendix 
1. The most important feature of the BSC-based compensation plan is that financial 
incentives are linked to corporate performance measures. 
  
 Current rewards 
Rewards for performance can be given now based on current performance or later based 
on sustained performance. DC-Company uses a current reward for middle-level 
managers. 
 
 Cash bonus 
DC-Company rewards its managers a cash bonus at year-end. 
 
 
Results 
The interview data revealed that the link of the bonus pay to the BSC only had a minor 
impact on the motivation of the middle-level managers to contribute to organizational 
performance. Because of lack of cascading, bonus pay of middle-level managers and 
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staff personnel was contingent on corporate performance. In other words, bonus pay was 
contingent on the corporate BSC and not on the BSC of their manufacturing division. 
So, middle-level managers and staff personnel were evaluated based on the scorecard of 
the higher organizational level. The consequence of this design characteristic was that 
middle-level managers and staff personnel experienced the performance measures as 
uncontrollable. Especially staff personnel of the manufacturing division was confronted 
with objectives and measures on their scorecard that they could not influence because 
the high-level strategic objectives and measures were not translated into local measures. 
Middle-level managers and staff personnel were not enabled to use their local and 
specific knowledge to make operational key elements of their business unit‟s strategy. 
They didn‟t see how their particular actions contributed to achieving business unit 
objectives. Using Vroom‟s expectancy theory, the expectancy that effort will lead to 
higher performance was violated. Therefore, middle-level managers and staff personnel 
were not extrinsically motivated to achieve organizational goals. 
Apart from the lack of cascading, the interviews revealed two other reasons, not 
anticipated in our theoretical foundation, for the lack of controllability. Middle-level 
managers experienced performance measures as uncontrollable because performance 
measures could not be influenced in the medium or in the long term. Assume „days of 
sickness leave‟ is a good measure of employee satisfaction but it may take two or more 
years to improve it. Another example is that middle-level managers experienced a lack 
of controllability when the portion of noise inherent to the performance measure was too 
high, specifically when the average event count per period was low. For example in a 
small unit, where the average number of sickness days is low; one accidental sickness 
period of only one worker may cause the performance measure to drop below target, 
although overall management care and employee satisfaction were under control. 
Furthermore, the lack of cascading also violated the instrumental relationship between 
performance and outcome. It happened that middle-level managers didn‟t earn a bonus 
although the projects for which they were responsible had been successful. It was 
possible that the target on the corporate performance measure was not achieved because 
one unit performed significantly below target. Since bonus pay was contingent on 
corporate performance, it was possible that every manager in the organization got 
penalized because of underperformance of one unit. 
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The last reason for the minor impact of the BSC-based compensation plan on 
performance had to do with the valence middle-level managers assigned to bonus pay. 
Expectancy theory states that monetary rewards have to be large enough to generate 
performance. At DC-Company, middle-level managers felt that the percentage of bonus 
pay was set too low. Maximum bonus pay was only 7% of yearly salary. Steven Kerr, 
chief learning officer at General Electric, estimated that monetary rewards must be at 
least 12% to 15% above employees‟ base pay to truly motivate people (Kreitner & 
Kinicki, 2001, p. 251). 
Due to the lack of strategic alignment of manufacturing processes, performance 
measures were not intrinsically motivating employees to contribute to organizational 
goals. Because of this lack, employees couldn‟t see how their actions affected 
organizational goals. 
To conclude, the objective of this paper was to demonstrate that strategic alignment of 
manufacturing processes is a precondition in a BSC-based compensation plan. We 
wanted to show that the BSC offers a unique device to align employees‟ objectives and 
strategic objectives. The idea behind strategic alignment is to confront each level in the 
organization with controllable performance measures. Performance on those measures 
contributes to overall organizational performance. Middle-level managers who are 
confronted with high controllable performance measures will be intrinsically motivated 
to achieve higher organizational performance because they can see the link between 
what they do and the organization‟s long term objectives. According to expectancy 
theory, linking extrinsic rewards to controllable performance measures will reinforce 
organizational performance. From the theory illustration case, we remember that the 
lack of cascading violates the effortperformance expectancy and the 
performanceoutcome instrumentality. We also remember that bonus pay has to be 
large enough to improve organizational performance. 
 
 
Direction for future research 
According to Keating (1995), the recommended next step in a theory illustration case is 
to specify or to test the illustrated theory. We would like to formally test the relationship 
between strategic alignment of manufacturing processes and organizational performance 
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in a BSC-environment. We think that a survey research will be an appropriate research 
methodology in order to test this research question.  
As in Joshi (2003) and in Kathuria (2003), a survey method is appropriate to 
operationalize the strategic alignment construct. In order to operationalize the strategic 
alignment construct we will need to collect matched pairs of data from two levels 
(corporate level and functional level) for each participating company.  
It is our contention that the relationship between strategic alignment of manufacturing 
processes and organizational performance will be moderated by contingency variables 
such as the nature of the business environment, the nature of the technology, the size of 
the manufacturing unit, the structure of the manufacturing unit, the business strategy, ... 
(Chenhall, 2003). Therefore we think that contingency research in this area is a 
promising direction for future research. 
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Appendix 1 
This appendix illustrates DC-Company‟s BSC-based compensation plan. 
The BSC-based compensation plan is built on eight performance measures. Each 
performance measure is weighted. All performance measures are aggregated in a 
performance index parameter. The following formula is used to determine bonus pay as 
a percentage of yearly salary: 
 
Bonus pay as percentage of yearly salary  
 = 7 % of yearly salary (in year 2000) * performance index parameter (%) 
Performance index parameter 
 =  total score on each performance measure 
Total score on each performance measure 
 = Result factor * weight of the performance measure 
Result factor 
The result factor indicates the extent to which the target on the performance measure is 
realized. 
 
As we see, the formula to calculate the bonus pay consists of two factors: (1) the 
maximum percentage of yearly salary that is variable (7% in year 2000) and (2) the 
performance index parameter. High performance on the performance index parameter 
can only be achieved by scoring high on the eight different performance measures. Due 
to lack of strategic alignment of manufacturing processes, the score on these 
performance measures can only be influenced by corporate performance and not by 
individual performance of middle-level managers. The performance index parameter 
(%) is the sum of contributions of each performance measure. The contribution of each 
performance measure is the product of „weight of each performance measure‟ and a 
„result factor‟. The result factor is calculated by a program in function of the „actual 
result‟ versus the „borders‟. DC-Company has defined four borders. Border 1 
corresponds with a degree of target realization of 70%, border 2 corresponds with a 
degree of target realization of 90%, border 3 corresponds with a degree of target 
realization of 110% and border 4 corresponds with a degree of target realization of 
130%. 
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Figure 2 shows the relation between the degree of target realization (border) and the 
result factor. 
Figure 2: Relation between degree of target realization and result factor 
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Table 3 is an illustration of the calculation of the performance index parameter. 
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Table 3: Bonus pay calculation system 
KPI-parameters Weight border1 border2 border3 border4 actual 
result 
Result 
factor % 
Total (%) 
 industrial accidents 12% 4 3 2 1 3.5 50 6 
Sick leave (days) 13% 6 5 4 3 5.5 50 6.5 
fixed costs (Million €) 13% 77.5 75 72.5 70 82.5 0 0 
 ton rework 12% 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 80,369 50 6 
 ton scrap 13% 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 121,246 0 0 
complaint frequency 12% 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.43 0 0 
on-time delivery 12% 97% 98% 99% 99.9% 96% 0 0 
 employees who follow course on multi-skilling 13% 50 60 70 80 53 50 6.5 
Performance Index Parameter (%) = Sum of total score on each performance measure 25 
Bonus pay as percentage (determined in advance) 7 
Bonus pay as percentage of yearly salary = 25 % * 7 % 1.75 of salary 
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Assume that the actual result on industrial accidents is 3,5. This score is situated 
between border one and two (see table 3). This position corresponds with a degree of 
target realization between 70% and 90%. We can read the result factor from the chart: 
the result factor amounts to 50%. The contribution of the performance measure 
„industrial accidents‟ to the performance index parameter is 6% (= 50% * 12%) given 
that the weight for the performance measure „industrial accidents‟ is 12%. If we repeat 
this procedure for each performance measure, we are able to calculate the performance 
index parameter. By multiplying the performance index parameter with the maximum 
percentage of yearly salary that is variable, DC-Company is able to determine the bonus. 
 
